In the age of synthetic media, software such as OpenAI’s DALL-E or ChatGPT can generate novel pieces of art and increase the overall supply for society. Deepfakes may allow our favorite performers and personalities to entertain us forever. Though this may be wonderful in some regards, there are also downsides. This Note will attempt to show that the existing patchwork of rights of publicity statutes and case law are inadequate to protect citizens from online harms in the age of synthetic media. Particularly, this Note will focus on postmortem right of publicity interests and protections because a robust market for the likenesses of deceased personalities exists and will likely grow in the age of synthetic media. This Note will then propose key features of a federal postmortem right of publicity statute that would realign federal protection with the interests the right was initially intended to protect—namely, the right to privacy and control over the use(s) of one’s likeness.

Conversations about destructive policing, violence, and questionable law enforcement practices have been a focus in social media in recent years. However, housing status is often a neglected, yet important, protected category that should be considered in conversations about the impact race, class, socioeconomic status, and other factors have on policing. This Note argues that since the NYPD has found alternate, less invasive means of accomplishing their objectives, NYPD officers who operate in Police Service Areas located on NYCHA property, are in violation of New York City Administrative Code Section 14-151 for targeting NYCHA residents, based on housing status, and therefore should be removed. Instead of watching and waiting for a NYCHA resident to commit the smallest infraction, police officers will be more inclined to arrive when absolutely necessary and, therefore, can devote their time to more important work.

Despite the New York Court of Appeals majority holding in People ex rel. Johnson, New York’s policy of detaining individuals beyond their maximum sentence because they are unable to procure SARA-compliant housing is plainly unconstitutional. The policy violates sex offenders’ fundamental right to be released from prison after serving their sentence. Further, the policy fails to meet even the most relaxed form of judicial review because the state has not shown that it benefits public safety. Indeed, there is virtually no evidence proving that this policy serves to protect the public at all, and a growing body of research shows that restrictive residence constraints create hardships that lead to recidivism. Finally, the policy violates sex offenders’ Eighth Amendment rights because it punishes them for being homeless, a status imposed upon them by the sex offender statute itself.

The worksite location requirements for the PERM process for immigrant visas and LCAs for specialty occupation nonimmigrant visas have lost their relevance during the revolution of the white-collar remote workspace within the United States under current DOL guidelines. Although on its face foreign nationals working outside the office appears to be a novel legal issue, remote work within the United States has been an insurmountable hurdle in the immigration space since telework gained popularity in the late twentieth century. It is possible to apply for both kinds of visas for telework, but adherence to the Farmer Memo appears to be unsustainable. It would be in the interest of employers—especially influential Silicon Valley tech companies who are some of the largest employers of foreign nationals—to modify the current guidelines to save costs on audits and appeals, and to retain their employees’ valid immigration status.