The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) predecessor established a legal presumption in favor of educating all students with disabilities in an integrated, “least restrictive environment” (LRE) to the “maximum extent appropriate.” Yet, the precise meaning of this statutory presumption remains unsettled, which has led to mounting special education disputes in federal court. This Article addresses a less developed area of IDEA litigation: namely, how federal courts should interpret this statutory presumption in light of the disproportionate placement of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities in separate settings.
Whether students with the most significant cognitive disabilities sacrifice their right to an integrated educational opportunity raises novel issues at the intersection of both liberty and equality. Despite the treatment that students with disabilities have received in judicial opinions and legal scholarship to date, neither forum has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the prevailing circuit split as it applies to students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. This Article aims to fill that gap. As a normative matter, moreover, the Article adds to the literature by demonstrating that students with the most significant cognitive disabilities should possess all of the same protections under the IDEA that are enjoyed by similarly-situated students with high-incidence disabilities. It then concludes by arguing in favor of adopting the Ninth Circuit’s four-factor balancing test as the most practical national judicial standard for assessing school districts’ compliance with the IDEA’s integration presumption.
Introduction
In the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren invalidated the long-sanctioned “separate but equal” doctrine by declaring that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”1 In doing so, the Brown Court laid the groundwork for significant social change, including the eventual passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA).2 The purpose of the EHA centered on ensuring that all students with disabilities received an equal educational opportunity, which had been all but denied to this population of students.3 Indeed, prior to EHA’s passage and enactment in 1975, the education of children with disabilities fell almost entirely within the ambit of state discretion: “[t]hrough most of the history of public schools in America, services to children with disabilities were minimal and were provided at the discretion of local school districts. Until the mid-1970’s, laws in most states allowed school districts to refuse to enroll any student they considered ‘uneducable,’ a term generally defined by local school administrators.”4 To address such rank exclusion, states began passing and enacting legislation to better protect students with disabilities.5 Although forty-five states enacted such legislation in the lead-up to the EHA’s enactment, the newly-enacted state laws often lacked adequate funding and enforcement mechanisms that could elicit broader compliance within and between school districts.6
Nearly five decades since its enactment, the EHA—which is now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)7—remains the nation’s preeminent disability rights statute for students with disabilities.8 The IDEA protects all students with disabilities living in states that have accepted federal financial aid,9 conferring both substantive and procedural rights upon more than seven million individuals.10 Procedurally, the IDEA mandates that public schools provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE),11 as determined by an individualized education plan (IEP),12 to all eligible children with disabilities.13 Substantively, the IDEA places an affirmative duty on participating states to identify, assess, and serve students with disabilities, regardless of the severity of their needs.14 Despite the foregoing progress, however, “special education is a leading sector of litigation in the K-12 public education context,” with “[t]he vast majority of this burgeoning litigation” arising under the IDEA.15
While most of this litigation has involved disputes as to whether school districts have complied with their affirmative obligation to provide a FAPE to eligible students with disabilities under the IDEA,16 legal scholars, commentators, and the courts have paid relatively little attention to the legal obligations owed to students with disabilities who have been placed in the most restrictive educational settings. This issue is particularly pronounced for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, a discrete population that constitutes a “non-categorical designation for those students participating in their state alternate assessment based on alternate achievement standards (AA-AAAS).”17 Indeed, recent empirical research suggests that, “[f]or the nearly 40,000 students participating in the AA-AAAS across a 15-state sample . . . a total of 93% [of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities] were served primarily in self-contained classrooms, separate schools, home[s], hospital[s], or residential settings.”18 Additionally, in spite of a wide body of evidence demonstrating that opportunities to learn and develop are enhanced in more inclusive educational settings,19 students with the most significant cognitive disabilities continue to be placed outside of general education classrooms “at a substantially greater rate . . . than . . . students in any single IDEA category.”20
This Article addresses a less developed area of IDEA litigation: namely, how federal courts should interpret the IDEA’s LRE requirement in light of the disproportionate placement of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities in separate educational settings. Put another way, to comply with the IDEA’s LRE mandate, students with disabilities must receive an opportunity to learn and interact with their non-disabled peers in general education classrooms to the maximum extent appropriate for their individual circumstances.21 In seeking the least restrictive environment for students with disabilities, school officials must consider a host of competing factors when determining the restrictiveness of the educational environment where such students are to be placed.22 Although the federal appellate courts have agreed that school officials must review these factors when determining the restrictiveness of the educational environment, each circuit has devised a different test for deciding whether the placement of a student with disabilities complies with the LRE requirement’s integration presumption.23 Indeed, courts in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits consider whether the segregated placement is comparatively superior to a general education placement when deciding if such placement is appropriate.24 In other jurisdictions, including the Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits, courts have instead adopted a multi-factor test to assess compliance with IDEA’s LRE mandate.25 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, has adopted a slightly modified version of the multi-factor test adopted in the Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits.26 Still, in other jurisdictions, including those in the First and Seventh circuits, courts have “declined to adopt” a “multi-factor test” for determining whether a district or state has complied with the LRE mandate,27 reasoning that “[t]he Act itself provides enough of a framework.”28
Whether students with the most significant cognitive disabilities sacrifice their right to an integrated educational opportunity raises novel issues at the intersection of both liberty and equality. Despite the treatment that students with disabilities have received in judicial opinions and legal scholarship to date, neither forum has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the prevailing circuit split as it applies to students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. This Article aims to fill that gap. As a normative matter, moreover, the Article adds to the literature by demonstrating that students with the most significant disabilities should possess all of the same protections under the IDEA that are enjoyed by similarly-situated students with high-incidence disabilities.29 It then argues that the on-going segregation of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities demands a judicial standard that aligns with the prevailing purpose of the IDEA and its LRE mandate. This purpose, as observed by one of the original drafters of the EHA’s integration presumption, was to “represent[] a gallant and determined effort to terminate the two-tiered invisibility once and for all with respect to exceptional children in the [n]ation’s school systems.”30 To achieve the stated purpose of the IDEA, this Article argues in favor of adopting the Ninth Circuit’s four-factor balancing test as the best, most practical national judicial standard for assessing school districts’ compliance with the IDEA’s integration presumption.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief history of the LRE mandate and traces its presumption that all students with disabilities are to be placed in integrated educational settings. Part II surveys the myriad benefits of receiving one’s education in an integrated classroom environment for all students, but especially among students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. It then details the harms engendered by schools and districts that fail to comply with IDEA’s integration presumption. Part III describes the prevailing circuit split and offers a critique of each jurisdiction’s approach to assessing compliance with the presumption. Part IV argues for the adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s four-factor balancing test as the best judicial standard that aligns with the original intent of the EHA and promotes inclusive educational opportunities for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. Part V responds to key policy and legal limitations to further support this Article’s central thesis. This Article then offers brief concluding remarks.
I. Revisiting the IDEA’s Integration Presumption
The cornerstone of the IDEA is its FAPE requirement.31 As briefly mentioned in the introduction, this requirement ensures that all children with disabilities are afforded the right to receive an education that is tailored to their unique needs, at no cost to an IDEA-eligible child’s parent(s) or guardian(s), and in the least restrictive environment. However, it is the latter element—the IDEA’s LRE requirement32—that serves as the primary focus of this Article’s thesis. Part I proceeds as follows: Section I.A explores the historical context of the IDEA’s LRE requirement, its presumption in favor of integrated educational settings, and the relevant case law interpreting its statutory and regulatory metes and bounds. Section I.B discusses the integration presumption as applied to students with high-incidence disabilities and the substantial benefits produced when schools and districts substantively comply with the presumption. Section I.C concludes this section by surveying the short- and long-term harms engendered by schools and districts that choose not to comply with the presumption’s terms.
A. Tracing the History of Educational Exclusion for Students with Disabilities
Long before the passage of the IDEA, students with disabilities faced a long history of not only educational exclusion, but also social exclusion. Indeed, during the nineteenth century, children with disabilities were largely viewed as a private matter—or “private trouble”33—that individual families had to navigate. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the advent of compulsory school attendance laws upended such social exclusion, compelling a population of children who were considered “uneducable”34 into public schools for the first time. From the 1950s through the early 1970s, the neglect and ableist vitriol that informed the broader social exclusion of children with disabilities in the preceding century continued apace within the nation’s public schools.35 In fact, the rank segregation of students with disabilities within the nation’s public schools ultimately led the White House Committee on Special Classes to condemn the state of special education classrooms as little more than a “dumping grounds” for students with specialized needs.36
Despite the abhorrent classroom conditions faced by students with disabilities, parents and community advocates “lobbied aggressively to root out [the] entrenched discrimination” that pervaded the nation’s public schools.37 Yet, by the 1971–72 school year—three years before the passage of the IDEA—“seven states were still educating fewer than 20% of their known children with disabilities, and [in] 19 states, fewer than a third. Only 17 states had reached the halfway figure.”38 With no federal law affording the right to attend public schools, disability rights activists advocated for the substantive inclusion of students with disabilities in mainstream educational settings.39 Borrowing from the anti-segregation theory proffered in Brown, these advocates argued that such segregated educational facilities and separate special education classes resulted in unequal, subpar educational experiences for students with disabilities.40 Ultimately, the foregoing advocacy helped secure constitutional protections for students with disabilities at the district court level.
In the seminal case of Mills v. Board of Education,41 parents of students with disabilities brought a class-action lawsuit against the District of Columbia’s Board of Education, challenging the exclusion of students with disabilities from public education in the District.42 Once again borrowing from the legal strategy adopted in Brown, the plaintiffs in Mills argued that the systematic denial of education to children with disabilities violated their constitutional rights under the federal Equal Protection Clause.43 The Mills court agreed and held that the District of Columbia’s public schools were required to provide a “free and suitable publicly-supported education[,] regardless of the degree of the child’s . . . disability or impairment.”44 Accordingly, the court’s ruling in Mills marked a significant legal moment in the fight for full inclusion by affirming that students with disabilities have a fundamental right to education.
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), a similar case filed the same year as Mills, parents of children with intellectual disabilities challenged the exclusion of these students from the state’s public education system.45 Much like in Mills, plaintiff parents relied on the legal strategy adopted in Brown to target then-existing state statutes and official school policy that permitted district officials to exclude children that they deemed “uneducable” from school.46 The court’s decision in PARC acknowledged that these students had been systematically excluded and, as a result, the court ordered significant reforms so as to provide appropriate educational services for students with disabilities.47 Taken together, PARC and Mills helped lay the foundation for the subsequent creation of the EHA, which is now known as the IDEA.48 But it was the Mills decision, in particular, that helped establish the “blueprint for what would later become federal special education law.”49
B. Framing the IDEA’s Central Provisions
Today, the IDEA50 and its implementing regulations51 function as the nation’s preeminent authorities that protect the rights owed to students with disabilities.52 The three central features of the IDEA are its (1) FAPE provision; (2) IEP provision; and (3) LRE requirement. Each of these elements plays a distinct yet interconnected role in advancing the central purpose of IDEA, which is to ensure that students with disabilities receive an inclusive and equitable education tailored to their unique needs. The following Sections explore the scope of each provision in turn.
1. Free Appropriate Public Education
The cornerstone of the IDEA lies in its mandate to ensure that all eligible students with disabilities have access to a FAPE.53 This foundational requirement, enshrined in both the statute and accompanying regulations,54 is the linchpin of the IDEA’s mission to provide equal educational opportunities to students with disabilities. Under the IDEA, the FAPE concept embodies the notion that students with disabilities must receive an education tailored to their unique needs—one that not only opens the doors to academic achievement but also supports their overall development.55 To operationalize the FAPE requirement, the IDEA establishes a comprehensive framework that encompasses the development of IEPs for each eligible child, including: regular assessments of student progress, parental involvement, and the provision of specialized services and accommodations.56 It is important to note, however, that the IDEA does not mandate that school districts adopt any specific education programs. Rather, the provision requires that school districts provide an educational opportunity that allows a student with disabilities to make progress in light of their circumstances.57
2. Individual Education Plans
The IEP is a legally binding document that outlines a student’s present level(s) of performance, annual goals, special education and related services, and the extent to which the student will participate in general education programs.58 As the educational roadmap for students with disabilities, the IEP ensures that each child with a disability is provided with appropriate support that will foster academic success and overall development.59 The term “appropriate” underscores the requirement that a district’s provision of education must be tailored to the individual needs of the student with disabilities.60 Additionally, schools and districts are required to regularly assess and monitor the progress of students who are receiving special education services.61 If a student’s needs or circumstances change within the intervening assessment periods, the IEP must be updated accordingly to ensure that the education remains appropriate in light of those changes.62 Finally, the IEP emphasizes the importance of parental involvement in the special education process.63
Indeed, parents or guardians have the right to participate in the development of their child’s IEP, and to have their concerns and input considered.64 Specifically, the IDEA affords parents of students with disabilities substantive legal rights, including: the right to accept or deny special education services; the right to request a district-funded special education evaluation by an independent third-party; and the right to meaningfully participate in the decision-making process that often determines the kinds of special education services that their child can expect to receive.65 Chief among these rights, at least for purposes of this Article’s thesis, is a parent’s ability to challenge an IEP team’s initial identification, evaluation, and the quality of services to—including the educational placement of—their child.66 Yet, despite this clear mandate, recent research makes clear that IEP teams are failing to comply with these terms.67 Worse still, evaluations of the current IDEA landscape by practitioners and parents have raised concerns with the IDEA’s IEP structure.68 In fact, one recurring concern exists among parents: that they believe schools do not view them as full partners in the IEP-creation process; instead, parents have reported feeling as if they are viewed by their IEP teams as ancillary, or even hindrances, to the broader IEP process.69
3. Least Restrictive Environment
The FAPE requirement under the IDEA is intrinsically connected to its LRE requirement. Indeed, the IDEA envisions that, to the maximum extent appropriate, students with disabilities should be educated alongside their non-disabled peers in general education classrooms.70 As one of the IDEA’s substantive requirements, the drafters of the LRE provision recognized that an inclusive environment benefits students with disabilities by providing them with opportunities for social interaction, academic growth, and exposure to grade-level curriculum.71 However, the LRE requirement is not absolute and must be balanced with the individual needs of the student. Accordingly, the FAPE requirement ensures that the education provided to a student with disabilities—whether in a general education setting or a more restrictive educational environment—must be tailored to meet that student’s unique needs and, until recently, result in some educational benefit.72 It is this latter, outcome-based determination—that is, whether a student with disabilities has received “some educational benefit”73 through the district’s provision of FAPE—that has confounded courts and advocates.74 Perhaps more importantly, at least for our purposes, the interaction between the provision of FAPE and its provision of “some educational benefit” closely intersects with the IDEA’s LRE requirement, as detailed in the following Sections.
Moreover, although the IDEA sets forth the specific content requirements that must accompany an IEP, the IDEA offers little guidance as to what constitutes a FAPE.75 Instead, the precise meaning of the FAPE standard has remained an open question left for the Court to decide. Two key Supreme Court decisions have endeavored to interpret and establish the standard’s meaning—Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley76 and Endrew F. ex rel Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1.77 In Rowley, the parents of Amy Rowley—a student with a hearing impairment enrolled in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District—contended that their daughter should be receiving a sign language interpreter for all of her academic courses.78 Although Amy had been performing “better than the average child in her class and [was] advancing easily from grade to grade,”79 Amy’s parents argued for an “equal educational opportunity” so that their child could reach her full potential.80 In rejecting their argument, the Rowley majority found that the IDEA requires school district officials to only offer students with disabilities a “basic floor of opportunity.”81 As a consequence, the exact parameters of the FAPE provision and its “educational benefit” mandate would go virtually undefined for thirty-five years, until the Supreme Court revisited the issue in Endrew F.
In Endrew F., the parents of Endrew, a student with autism enrolled in the Colorado Douglas County (CDC) public schools, argued that the school district had failed to provide a FAPE in an individualized manner, as prescribed in the IDEA.82 As a CDC student from kindergarten to the fourth grade, Endrew’s academic progress began to slow as he moved through each grade.83 He began exhibiting concerning behavioral challenges, such as yelling during class time and leaving the premises unannounced during the school day.84 Endrew’s parents, having grown weary of the educational environment provided at CDC, enrolled their son at the Firefly Autism House, a private special education school. While there, Endrew’s behavior “improved significantly, permitting him to make a degree of academic progress that eluded him in public school.”85 The progress achieved at the Firefly Autism School ultimately informed his parent’s legal claim. That is, Endrew’s parents claimed that CDC deprived Endrew of a FAPE given their failure to create an IEP with the kinds of substantive supports that he received while a student at the Firefly Autism School.86 The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding that school officials were required to create an IEP that would “enable [Endrew] to make progress,” while also “set[ting] out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement.”87 Although the Endrew Court failed to establish a “bright-line rule”88 in its holding, it did strengthen the FAPE standard from the paltry “more than de minimis”89 standard that was articulated in Rowley nearly thirty-five years earlier. More crucially, the Court’s holding in Endrew F. raised the bar in terms of the justification that school districts had to provide when placing a child in a particular educational setting.90 The next Section further unpacks the LRE provision’s presumption that all students with disabilities must be placed in an integrated setting to the maximum extent appropriate.
C. Unpacking the IDEA’s Integration Presumption
At its core, the IDEA’s individualized integration presumption was designed to help ensure that the specter of such educational exclusion is neither revived nor reimagined. Yet the presumption is, as the moniker suggests, merely a presumption. The statutory provision that establishes the presumption’s scope requires integration only “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate,” expressly permitting placement in “special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment” when “the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”91 By its own terms, then, the presumption mandates that school personnel engage in an individualized assessment of each child’s unique needs before determining whether a given placement is “appropriate” in light of those identified needs. Therefore, “[t]he responsibility is not on the student to conform to any particular level of functioning but rather on the school to determine how to address a student’s individually determined learning needs, which may differ than those of peers.”92
The Act’s implementing regulations closely track its statutory terms, mandating that “[e]ach public agency must ensure that—(i) [t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are [to be] educated with children who are non-disabled.”93 The regulations further contemplate that “[s]pecial classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment [is to] occur[] only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”94 Both the statutory and regulatory provisions form the basis of the LRE mandate. Perhaps more importantly, the creation of the presumption not only represented a material shift in policy at the time of its enactment, but also spurred profound societal change by challenging longstanding discriminatory practices while affirming the right to an equal educational opportunity for all students with disabilities.95 In sum, the LRE mandate reflects the IDEA’s broader presumption that, for virtually all students, the provision of a free appropriate public education implies both placement in mainstream educational environments and appropriate progression through grade levels.96
II. The Miseducation of Students With the Most Significant Cognitive Disabilities
Students with the most significant cognitive disabilities continue to be disproportionately placed in separate, highly restrictive educational settings as compared with students with high-incidence disabilities.97 Although nearly two-thirds of students with high-incidence disabilities were placed in general education classrooms at least eighty percent of the time as of 2018,98 a mere three percent of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities were placed in general education classrooms at least eighty percent of the time.99 In addition, more than ninety percent of students with extensive support needs were placed in segregated settings, such as self-contained classrooms and entirely separate schools.100
Such disparate levels of segregation not only contradict the legislative purpose of the IDEA’s integration presumption, but also engender significant short- and long-term costs in the lives of students with extensive support needs. The following Sections proceed as follows: Section II.A briefly describes the benefits produced by receiving one’s education in an integrated classroom environment, especially among students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. Section II.B will then detail the harms engendered by schools and districts who fail to comply with the integration presumption. Section II.C offers Massachusetts as a case example to underscore the educational harms wrought by excluding students with the most significant cognitive disabilities from the general education classroom and, ultimately, the curriculum.
A. Charting the Benefits of Educational Inclusion
The exclusion of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities ignores a wide body of research underscoring the positive effects that such inclusion produces for students with and without significant cognitive disabilities.101 Indeed, the benefits of appropriately educating students with the most significant cognitive disabilities are legion. Some of these benefits include “higher academic achievement . . . greater self-determination skills . . . and improved communication skills . . . .”102 For students without disabilities, the benefits are similarly noteworthy. As observed by a recent report by the National Council on Disability (NCD), general education classrooms that were inclusive of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities fostered “reduced fear of human differences, increased comfort and awareness of differences, growth in social cognition, improvements in self-concept, growth of ethical principles, and caring friendships,” among students without disabilities.103 Moreover, specially designed instruction and support services, a requirement of the IDEA,104 can be provided within inclusive settings, thereby allowing students with the most significant cognitive disabilities to make meaningful progress in their academic and social development.105 Therefore, inclusion in general education settings provides students with significant cognitive disabilities access to, among other things, a richer curriculum and a diverse array of social and emotional benefits.106
B. Charting the Harms of Educational Exclusion
Segregating students with significant cognitive disabilities from general education settings can also have detrimental effects on both the excluded students and the broader educational community in at least two central ways. First, such educational exclusion exacerbates social isolation and marginalization.107 When students with significant cognitive disabilities are inappropriately placed in segregated educational settings, they miss out on the opportunity to interact and build relationships with their typically-developing peers.108 Such isolation can lead to feelings of loneliness and a lack of belonging, which can have long-lasting negative effects on one’s self-esteem and mental well-being.109 Second, such educational exclusion can result in limited access to a challenging and diverse curriculum.110 When students with the most significant cognitive disabilities are placed in separate, less academically rigorous settings, they often lack access to the same grade-level content standards and the same high academic expectations that their peers receive in inclusive environments.111
Such academically diluted settings can impede long-term learning, academic success, and ultimately limit future opportunities. In fact, recent empirical research suggests that “[i]n studies examining the academic outcomes of participants with [significant cognitive disabilities] across settings, the inclusive environment was associated with higher scores and larger effect sizes in literacy . . . and math . . . compared with the segregated environment.”112 Furthermore, “[o]ut of the studies examining students’ social outcomes across settings (i.e., inclusive; segregated), the majority (80%) demonstrated that students with [the most significant cognitive disabilities] served in the general education classroom alongside same-age peers had better outcomes than those served in segregated settings.”113 The following Section offers a case example to exemplify the harms wrought by the inappropriate exclusion of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities from general education settings.
C. The Curious Case of Massachusetts
Under the federal Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), all students, including those with disabilities, are required to participate in state assessments to measure their academic progress.114 Accommodations are provided to students with disabilities to ensure a fair assessment of their learning.115 As observed by recent federal guidance, there are two paths that meet the foregoing state assessment requirement under ESSA: (1) the general assessment aligned with their grade-level standards, or (2) the alternate assessment aligned to alternate academic achievement standards (AA-AAAS) designed for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities.116 Regardless of the chosen assessment path, all students are expected to meet state academic content standards, with appropriate modifications for those taking alternate assessments.117 It is important to note, however, that alternate assessments aligned to alternate achievement standards are only authorized for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, a term neither defined by the IDEA nor ESSA.118 Instead, the IDEA and ESSA defer to the states to define the term, mandating only that the state include “factors related to cognitive functioning and adaptive behavior . . . .”119 Finally, for each academic subject, ESSA caps the number of students who may be assessed with the AA-AAAS at one percent of all students tested during a given year.120 However, states are permitted to exceed this federally-imposed cap by filing a waiver with the United States Department of Education.121
In Massachusetts, assessing students based on alternate achievement standards—often as early as third grade—is a high-stakes decision because students must attain a specific competency determination score on the state’s alternative exam—also known as the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System Alternate (MCAS-Alt) exam122—as a condition of receiving a regular high school diploma.123 However, this high-stakes decision reveals a prevailing tension between the objectives of the broader Massachusetts special education program and the dictates of the MCAS. On the one hand, the Massachusetts special education program is designed to ensure that school officials identify and appropriately accommodate students with unique learning needs.124 On the other hand, Massachusetts imposes a uniform MCAS exam score requirement for all students to obtain a high school diploma, irrespective of their special education status.125 This incongruity between the State’s policy of recognizing and accommodating special education students’ distinct learning needs and its high school graduation policy requiring MCAS performance at a level that is equivalent to typically-achieving students leads to substantial short- and long-term harms for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities across the Commonwealth.
In terms of short-term harms, students with the most significant cognitive disabilities who are inappropriately placed on the MCAS-Alt track will be learning on substantially modified learning standards.126 Recall that federal regulations require that students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, much like students without low-incidence disabilities, must “achieve measurable gains on the challenging State academic content standards for the grade in which the student is enrolled.”127 Put another way, Congress intentionally established the one percent cap to ensure that students with disabilities who have been identified for, and subsequently placed on, the AA-AAAS track are still effectively taught, provided full and meaningful educational opportunities, and assessed based on the grade-level achievement standards set for all students. Yet, in far too many instances, students in Massachusetts who are placed on the MCAS-Alt track are relegated to segregated classrooms and taught a diluted curriculum that imparts limited academic skills.
In terms of long-term harms, MCAS-Alt placement decisions carry significant implications for future students’ academic and non-academic success. Academically, all students—regardless of the assessment that they take—are required to have instruction based on state academic content standards for the grade in which they are enrolled. As mentioned above, the difference for students who take an alternate assessment is that the expectations for achievement are modified with respect to the grade-level content they are taught. This means that all students with disabilities must participate in either the general assessment for the grade in which the student is enrolled (in Massachusetts, the MCAS) or the AA-AAAS (MCAS-Alt).128 The troublesome academic implication lies in the fact that all students in Massachusetts, even those who have unique learning needs, must also attain a specific competency determination score on the State’s general MCAS assessment as a condition of receiving a regular high school diploma.129
Yet, as discussed above, students placed on the MCAS-Alt track are learning on substantially modified learning standards. These substantially modified standards are often the result of ineffective instruction, instruction by unqualified teachers, and/or a lack of appropriate special education and supportive services that would allow a student to access the general education curriculum.130 Absent the opportunity to learn to the same challenging academic standards as students without disabilities, then, students who are placed on the MCAS-Alt track—again, often as early as third grade—are effectively denied the grade-level content knowledge that is needed to pass the general MCAS assessment, which, ipso facto, precludes those participating in AA-AAAS from earning a regular high school diploma in Massachusetts.131 Non-academically, the long-term harms of failing to earn a regular high school diploma in the twenty-first century are well-documented.132
Worse still, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) has failed to ensure that students of color, students from low-income families, and English learners with disabilities are not disproportionately placed on the MCAS-Alt. Indeed, data that DESE submitted in its request for a waiver for the 2022–23 school year demonstrates that, during the State’s previous five-year waiver period, DESE failed to critically examine and “address any disproportionality in the percentage of students . . . taking an alternate assessment aligned with alternate academic achievement standards.”133 For the 2021–22 academic year, the percentage of African American students, Latinx students, emergent bilingual students, students from low-income backgrounds, and students with disabilities well exceeded the federally-imposed one percent cap on MCAS-Alt placement.134 Further troubling is that these same populations have been significantly more likely to be assigned to take alternate assessments than their comparison peers.135 In fact, the largest disparity in such placement is between students from low-income families and their more affluent counterparts, with the former being assessed on alternate assessments aligned to alternate academic achievement standards at a staggering two-and-a-half times the rate of students from non-low-income families.136
To be sure, Massachusetts is not an outlier with regard to its segregation of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. Indeed, “for Fall 2018, placement rates in separate schools, by state, varied from well under 1% of all students with intellectual disabilities to a high of 22%.”137 Perhaps more importantly, at least for purposes of this Article’s thesis, the misapplication of the integration presumption may be the result of “local and state-level variations in interpretation of the law.”138 The foregoing evidence highlights the importance of inclusive education for students with significant cognitive disabilities, emphasizing the educational and social benefits of integrating students into general education settings. It also underscores the pervasive and lasting harms associated with such educational exclusion, including social isolation and limited access to a diverse general curriculum.
To address these issues and ensure a more consistent approach to creating inclusive educational settings, advocates must work to establish a national standard for the federal circuit courts on how best to apply the IDEA’s integration presumption. Identifying a national standard would be particularly helpful for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, a population that is disproportionately excluded from participation in general education classrooms. Advocating for such a standard would also help clarify the legal framework and expectations surrounding inclusive education, thereby promoting a more equitable and inclusive educational system that benefits all students.
III. Searching For a National Standard: Surveying the LRE Circuit Split
In accordance with the legislative framework articulated in Section 1412(a)(5)(A), Congress has expressed a distinct preference for the integration, or “mainstreaming,” of students with disabilities alongside their non-disabled peers. This statutory mandate underscores the principle that children with disabilities should be educated within the regular educational environment to the maximum extent appropriate.139 The use of special classes, separate schooling, or any form of removal from mainstream settings is only permissible when the nature or severity of a child’s disability makes it impractical to achieve educational objectives satisfactorily within regular classes, even with the provision of supplementary aids and services.140 While the federal circuit courts universally acknowledge this overarching mandate, they have devised conflicting tests to assess whether the placement of students with disabilities complies with the mainstreaming, or the least restrictive environment requirement. The following Part proceeds as follows. Section III.A details the Roncker test and offers a critique of its practical application. Section III.B explores the elements of the Daniel R.R. test and provides a critique of its cost-based limitations. Section III.C describes the scope of the First and Seventh Circuit tests and critiques its lack of a consistent standard to balance competing IDEA requirements. Finally, Section III.D analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s Rachel H. test and argues that, although potential drawbacks exist, its limitations are of less consequence when compared to LRE tests in other federal circuits.
A. The Roncker Test (Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits)
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits employ the Roncker test to determine compliance with the LRE mandate by focusing on situations where a segregated facility is considered superior.141 The Roncker test instructs courts to assess whether the services that render the segregated placement superior could reasonably be provided in a non-segregated setting.142 It also recognizes that some handicapped children may need to be educated in segregated facilities due to the infeasibility of benefiting from mainstreaming or because the benefits derived from specialized services outweigh those gained from inclusion.143 Further, the Roncker test acknowledges cost as a relevant factor to its analysis, provided it does not serve as a defense if the school district fails to allocate funds to provide a proper continuum of alternative placements for students with disabilities.144 However, the Roncker test’s potential costs lie in its subjective assessment of whether services could reasonably be provided in a non-segregated setting. This subjectivity may lead to inconsistency in legal decisions across cases. Additionally, the consideration of cost, while pragmatic, could inadvertently result in budgetary considerations outweighing the best interests of students, creating a potential legal hurdle in balancing financial constraints with the LRE mandate.
B. The Daniel R.R. Test (Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits)
Adopted by the Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Daniel R.R. test involves a two-part inquiry.145 First, the test determines whether education in the regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and services, can be deemed satisfactory for a specific student with disabilities.146 If not, and the school intends to provide special education or remove the child from regular education, the second part of the inquiry assesses if the child has been mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate.147 The court in Daniel R.R. identified a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide the foregoing steps, underscoring that no one factor is conclusive.148 For the first step, the state’s efforts to accommodate the student in the regular classroom are scrutinized.149 While not obligated to provide every conceivable aid or service, states must make some attempt to accommodate the student.150 This initial inquiry extends beyond academic accommodations, encompassing the child’s overall educational experience and their broader impact on the regular classroom environment.151 Courts are also permitted to consider the cost of supplementary aids and services.152 For the second step, the IDEA’s provision of a continuum of services is paramount, permitting intermediate steps along this continuum as needed.153 Despite its comprehensiveness, however, the Daniel R.R. test introduces complexity with its two-part inquiry, potentially leading to inconsistent application. The consideration of costs may also pose a significant legal hurdle, as schools might prioritize budgetary concerns over students’ individualized needs, which would potentially conflict with the IDEA’s core requirements.
C. The First & Seventh Circuit Tests
In contrast to the foregoing circuits, the First and Seventh Circuits have declined to embrace a multifaceted test for ascertaining compliance with the least restrictive environment mandate,154 asserting that the statutory framework itself provides adequate guidance.155 The First Circuit’s approach involves a deliberative weighing of the advantages derived from mainstreaming against the educational enhancements achievable in a more restrictive, non-mainstream environment.156 Put differently, the central inquiry in the First Circuit revolves around striking a balance between the benefits of integration and the potential for academic improvement in an alternative, less inclusive setting.157 The Seventh Circuit maintains a more straightforward approach: the court evaluates whether education in a more conventional school was satisfactory and, if not, whether reasonable measures could have made it so.158 Should integration into a more conventional education prove unsatisfactory and beyond reasonable enhancement, a court in this district should find a school or district in compliance with the statute if its proposed placement maximizes the extent to which students remain integrated with their typically achieving peers.159
These distinct approaches in the First and Seventh Circuits underscore the interpretive latitude that various jurisdictions have exercised in crafting their methods for evaluating compliance with the LRE mandate. The potential legal hurdle with these two approaches, however, lies in their potential for subjectivity and inconsistency in assessing the balance between integration and potential academic improvements. The absence of a clear and standardized test may lead to varied interpretations and outcomes, potentially raising concerns about equal application of the LRE mandate for those students with the most significant cognitive disabilities.
D. The Rachel H. Test (Ninth Circuit)
The Ninth Circuit, in Sacramento City Unified School District, Board of Education v. Rachel H., adopted a modified version of the factors in both Daniel R.R. and Roncker.160 The Rachel H. test is a four-factor balancing assessment, which considers (1) the educational benefits of full-time placement in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect on both the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the costs associated with mainstreaming the student.161 This test provides a nuanced approach to determining compliance with the LRE mandate in the context of a student’s individual circumstances.162 As a potential national standard, the Rachel H. test raises both benefits and costs, especially as applied to educating students with the most significant cognitive disabilities.
In terms of costs, the multi-factor nature of the Rachel H. test may introduce unnecessary complexity into future legal proceedings, making it potentially challenging for courts to consistently apply the test. But this potential drawback becomes less of a concern when one considers the clear structure of the test and its focus on individualized assessment.163 Moreover, while cost consideration is a pragmatic aspect of the Rachel H. test, there is an underlying concern that districts may prioritize cost-saving measures over adherence to the IDEA’s directives, especially for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities.164 Although a valid concern, the test’s focus on both individualized benefits and costs balances this concern to a greater degree than the competing judicial tests. The following Part considers these costs and benefits in more detail. It then argues in favor of adopting the Rachel H. test as the best, most practical national standard for evaluating and implementing the IDEA’s LRE standard for students with both high- and low-incidence disabilities.
IV. Discussion: Adopting the Rachel H. Test as the LRE National Standard
Students with disabilities, including those with the most significant cognitive disabilities, must receive an education in the least restrictive environment.165 The Rachel H. test presents a distinctive approach to evaluating compliance with this mandate, emphasizing a four-factor balancing assessment that encompasses both academic and non-academic factors.166 The following Sections delve into the potential ramifications—both positive and negative—of adopting the Rachel H. test as a national standard for evaluating LRE compliance, with a central focus on the test’s impacts on students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. Section IV.A begins by arguing in favor of adopting the Rachel H. test as the best, most practical national standard for circuits to evaluate compliance with the IDEA’s LRE requirement, identifying three key benefits that counsel in favor of its uniform adoption. Building upon the preceding Section, Section IV.B then contends that the factors enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Rachel H. are better aligned with the IDEA’s “Zero Reject” approach than competing circuit tests. Section IV.C concludes by arguing that adopting the Rachel H. test best conforms with the FAPE standard as articulated by the Supreme Court in Endrew F.
A. Surveying the Benefits of the Rachel H. Test as the National Standard
This Section argues in favor of adopting the Rachel H. test as the best, most practical judicial test for implementing the IDEA’s integration presumption for at least three reasons. First, adopting the Rachel H. test promotes greater flexibility and individualization. Indeed, the Rachel H. test provides a nuanced evaluation that allows courts to consider a broader spectrum of factors beyond purely academic factors.167 This flexibility ensures that the unique needs and circumstances of each student can be taken into account, promoting individualized decision-making that aligns with the broader purpose of the IDEA and its integration presumption.168
Second, by adopting the Rachel H. test as the national standard for evaluating LRE claims, all students with disabilities will be afforded greater access to the general education curriculum. This benefit is especially important for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, who have, as mentioned previously, been disproportionately placed in segregated educational settings.169 By assessing both academic and non-academic benefits, the Rachel H. test encourages a holistic understanding of the impact of mainstreaming on a student’s overall development.170 It also promotes the notion that inclusion encompasses not only academic progress but also social and emotional growth,171 thereby fostering a more inclusive educational environment for all learners, including those with the most significant cognitive disabilities.
Third, and finally, adopting the Rachel H. test is better able to balance prevailing costs associated with educating students within the least restrictive environment.172 This is because “[t]he court recognized its origins in Daniel R.R. but also followed Greer by adding the cost of mainstreaming as a consideration available to courts.”173 When viewed in light of the comparatively substantial near- and long-term costs of miseducating students with the most significant cognitive disabilities in separate educational settings, however, the adoption of the Rachel H. test serves as the most comprehensive approach to implementing the LRE requirement for all learners.
B. The Rachel H. Test’s Alignment with the IDEA’s “Zero Reject” Approach
The “Zero Reject” approach and the LRE requirement are integral components of the IDEA. The Zero Reject approach, much like the LRE requirement, acts as a safeguard against the exclusion of children with disabilities.174 Under this approach, schools are prohibited from refusing admission to students with disabilities based solely on their disabilities, irrespective of the severity of the child’s disability.175 This principle is aimed at preventing discrimination and ensuring that children with disabilities have equal access to educational opportunities.176
Complementing the Zero Reject approach is IDEA’s LRE requirement. As mentioned above, this requirement stipulates that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities are to be educated alongside their typically-achieving peers in the general education classroom.177 The LRE principle recognizes the value of inclusion and seeks to minimize the removal of students with disabilities from regular educational environments.178 Together, both the Zero Reject approach and the LRE requirement embody the core principles of equal access and individualized education for children with disabilities. By preventing exclusion and promoting inclusion, therefore, both the Zero Reject approach and the LRE requirement endeavor to provide children with disabilities the support they need to succeed both academically and socially while upholding their affirmative right to equal educational opportunity under the IDEA.
At the heart of IDEA’s Zero Reject principle is the unwavering commitment to ensure that no child with a disability is excluded from receiving a FAPE.179 The Rachel H. test echoes this principle through its approach to providing a personalized, individualized assessment of each student’s educational needs.180 Importantly, the Zero Reject principle implicitly acknowledges that students with the most significant cognitive disabilities are a diverse group of learners, with each student presenting unique challenges and strengths. This individualized assessment ensures that educational placements are not dictated by a one-size-fits-all approach; instead, the Rachel H. test is tailored to meet the specific learning styles possessed by each student. What’s more, students with the most significant cognitive disabilities often face challenges that extend far beyond academics. Similarly, the Zero Reject approach recognizes that educational progress encompasses not only cognitive development but also social and emotional well-being. The Rachel H. test, in its four-factor assessment, explicitly considers these non-academic benefits. Indeed, the test acknowledges that, for many students, progress in social interaction, communication, and emotional stability are as crucial to one’s overall success as academic achievement.181
As set forth in the IDEA and subsequent case law, the Zero Reject principle stands for the proposition that public school districts must accept all IDEA-eligible children irrespective of their current capacity to serve them.182 The Rachel H. test strikes a similar balance by factoring in costs while viewing these costs through the lens of individualized benefits.183 Put another way, the Rachel H. factors recognize that educational placements must be both appropriate and reasonably feasible. By placing costs in the context of individualized benefits, then, the Rachel H. test ensures that financial constraints do not overshadow the fundamental commitment to providing students with disabilities—including those students identified as possessing significant cognitive disabilities—an education that is tailored to their unique needs and potential.
Taken together, this Part contends that the Rachel H. test’s individualized assessment, consideration of non-academic benefits, and balanced approach to cost assessment are closely aligned with the central purpose of the IDEA’s Zero Reject approach. Thus, the IDEA’s Zero Reject approach and its LRE requirement endorse the same precepts animating the Rachel H. test’s four factors: “educational equality as a human rights claim and fulfill[ing] the demands of children with disabilities for inclusive education as ‘individuals, equal in dignity to normal children.’”184
C. LRE’s Conformance with Endrew F.’s Interpretation of IDEA’s FAPE Standard
Building on the benefits to educational inclusion discussed above, Section IV.C contends that the Rachel H. test best aligns with the FAPE standard as interpreted by the Supreme Court in its Endrew F. decision. Specifically, it recognizes that, for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, an appropriate education extends beyond pure academic progress. Instead, “appropriate” in this context encompasses both social and emotional development, two integral components of the FAPE standard. If uniformly adopted as the national judicial standard for interpreting compliance with the IDEA’s integration presumption, then, the Rachel H. test would better comport with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAPE requirement in Endrew F. rather than the Court’s interpretation of the FAPE requirement in Rowley.
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley established the foundation for understanding the FAPE standard.185 The Rowley Court emphasized that FAPE does not require schools to maximize the potential of children with disabilities but instead ensures that students receive an individualized education tailored to their needs that provides only some educational benefit.186 Although the four-factor Rachel H. test aligns with the Rowley Court’s interpretation of the FAPE requirement by fostering an individualized assessment of students with significant cognitive disabilities,187 thereby adhering to the core principle that FAPE must be tailored to the unique needs of each student, the test’s alignment with Rowley ultimately falters given the Court’s interpretation of FAPE as only requiring a “basic floor of opportunity” which need only be “individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.”188 Indeed, the “some educational benefit” language articulated by the Court in Rowley established a lower threshold of accountability for districts charged with educating students with disabilities.189 Therefore, without defining a more precise benefit that is to be provided by school districts, the holding in Rowley allows for greater subjectivity, and thus a greater chance for abuse on the part of school districts, as to the level of educational opportunity that it must provide to students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. This concern is especially pronounced as it relates to testing and assessment decisions, as illustrated by the Massachusetts case example.190
In Endrew F., however, the Supreme Court expanded upon the FAPE standard set forth in Rowley by clarifying that FAPE must offer students with disabilities more than merely de minimis educational progress.191 Instead, the Endrew F. Court emphasized that the educational program provided by districts must be “appropriately ambitious”192 and “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”193 The key interpretative shift here is the emphasis on “appropriately ambitious” and “appropriate progress,” rather than merely “some benefit,” as articulated in Rowley. In terms of the former shift, the Endrew F. Court stressed that an educational program must be designed with high expectations tailored to the child’s individual potential.194 It rejected the idea that FAPE could be satisfied by providing a program that merely met minimal standards or offered only trivial progress.195 In terms of the latter shift, the Endrew F. Court clarified that a child’s progress must be evaluated in the context of the individual child’s unique needs and circumstances. In so doing, the Court recognized that children with disabilities have diverse abilities and challenges, and their IEPs should reflect that diversity. The Rachel H. test—with its individualized assessment, consideration of non-academic benefits, and a holistic view of students’ overall well-being—likewise conforms with the Endrew F. Court’s heightened interpretation of the FAPE standard. The Rachel H. test recognizes that educational progress extends beyond academics and underscores the importance of ambitious, individualized educational goals for students with disabilities, which includes students with the most significant cognitive disabilities.
V. Addressing Legal and Policy Limitations
This Part addresses the arguments presented in opposition of adopting the Rachel H. test as a national standard for evaluating compliance with the IDEA’s integration presumption. It identifies potential legal and policy limitations while providing responses that demonstrate how the Rachel H. test can overcome these concerns. The following Part considers each argument in turn.
A. The Rachel H. Test and the “Zero Reject” Principle as a Tenuous Connection
One of the central claims in favor of the Rachel H. test’s uniform adoption is its alignment with IDEA’s Zero Reject principle. Yet, critics argue that full integration might lead “the education of non-disabled students [to be] compromised by the time-consuming, highly-individualized demands of their special education counterparts.”196 Worse still, according to some critics, the Zero Reject approach, which advances the principle of full inclusion, undermines the primary purpose of K-12 schooling, which is to create “learning communit[ies] for the transfer of knowledge where each student can and will obtain a serious education.”197 Yet the Rachel H. test, with its emphasis on individualized assessment, still adheres to the core spirit of the Zero Reject principle. By tailoring educational placements to the unique needs of each student, the test aims to minimize exclusionary practices while recognizing that the Zero Reject principle does not equate to a one-size-fits-all approach.
Another potential limitation of the Rachel H. test is its ambiguity in balancing the necessary costs and benefits of educating students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. Critics may argue that this could lead to subjective interpretations and may inadvertently prioritize cost-saving measures over the best interests of students.198 However, the Rachel H. test provides a structured framework for considering costs, ensuring that they are viewed in the context of individualized benefits. While some subjectivity may exist, this is an inherent aspect of individualized education planning and is not fatal for the purposes of the thesis offered here. Accordingly, the Rachel H. test’s emphasis on evaluating costs relative to the unique benefits that full integration affords to each student mitigates any prevailing concern about cost prioritization.
A broader challenge lies in the applicability of the Rachel H. test as a national standard. Opponents contend that the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court renders the Rachel H. factors difficult to weigh when determining the appropriateness of full inclusion.199 Yet, the Rachel H. test offers a balanced and individualized approach that can be adapted to diverse contexts. Moreover, it provides clear guidance for weighing factors consistently, reducing the potential for inconsistency in its application while aligning with the purpose of the IDEA, more broadly, and its integration presumption, more specifically.
Lastly, the arguments in favor of the Rachel H. test highlight its alignment with the Endrew F. Court’s interpretation of the IDEA’s FAPE standard. Opponents of this position may question whether a single test can adequately address the nuances of this seminal case law and whether a comprehensive FAPE standard should allow for multiple approaches.200 However, this Article contends that the Rachel H. test’s comprehensive framework better aligns with varying FAPE interpretations. Indeed, the test’s focus on individualization in the setting of educational goals aligns with Endrew F.’s central holding, which strengthened the FAPE standard from the comparatively weaker “more than de minimis” standard articulated in Rowley.201 By adopting the Rachel H. test as the national judicial standard for interpreting the IDEA’s integration presumption, then, a more unified framework is readily established that reflects the guiding principles of the presumption while ensuring more consistent compliance nationwide.
Conclusion
The IDEA embodies a comprehensive and critical framework for addressing the unique educational needs of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities. Yet, fewer than half of states meet the requirements and purposes set forth in the IDEA—as measured by both compliance and results data—resulting in less effective protection of parents’ and students’ rights.202 This limitation, as described above, includes the IDEA’s LRE provision. For students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, moreover, such non-compliance with the IDEA’s integration presumption is particularly troubling. Accordingly, to meaningfully address the disproportionate placement of students with the most significant cognitive disabilities in separate classrooms and school, this Article argues in favor of adopting the Rachel H. test as a national standard for evaluating compliance with the LRE mandate. As a national standard, the Rachel H. test produces myriad benefits, particularly in its nuanced and holistic approach to evaluating LRE compliance within and between school districts. While potential drawbacks exist, these drawbacks are not fatal to the broader project of creating fully integrated educational settings. Further, the Rachel H. test’s individualized assessment, consideration of non-academic benefits, and balanced approach to cost assessment align with the IDEA’s Zero Reject approach and the FAPE standard as articulated by the Supreme Court in Endrew F. Therefore, by embracing the Rachel H. test as the most practical national standard to assessing LRE compliance, all students with disabilities—but especially those with the most significant cognitive disabilities—will be more consistently afforded an inclusive educational setting that is tailored to their unique needs and, ultimately, their potential.