Staying in the Takings Lane: The Compensation Issue in Cedar Point Nursery

The Supreme Court held in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid that a California regulation mandating that union organizers have occasional access to privately owned farms was a per se taking because it stripped the farm owners of the right to exclude. This Article focuses on questions that arise if one accepts the Court’s conclusion that the regulation is indeed a taking, including whether to permit or enjoin the taking, how to measure compensable losses, and, more particularly, whether to compensate owners because the regulation makes them more vulnerable to what they see as profit-reducing unionization. This Article argues that owners in Cedar Point Nursery are entitled to compensation only for the loss of rights that physical takings law protects—in cases like this of temporary access mandates, losses that inhere in having to share use of a portion of the property with others. Further, we must deal with the validity of laws limiting the capacity to suppress unionization efforts in their own right.

HIPPA

“HIPPA” does not exist. The real acronym for the 1996 Health Information Portability and Accountability Act is HIPAA—“privacy” is not even in the title. But many have invoked “HIPPA” in seeking to keep their personal health decisions private and autonomous. No doubt a complicated statutory and regulatory regime, HIPAA’s scope is much narrower than the average person understands, applying mainly to health care providers and insurers. But its complexity does not explain the widespread and erroneous expectation that federal law will shield those who want to keep their health information, like vaccination status, to themselves. Asserting a right to confidentiality under “HIPPA” demonstrates a failure to understand the interconnected nature of public health, looking instead to claim an inviolable shield. But those who mock the “HIPPA” invokers fail to appreciate the real costs to health privacy and personal autonomy that the pandemic has engendered. All sides should approach these questions from a perspective of compromise and understanding—not as a conflict of unassailable rights.

Repairing Our System of Constitutional Accountability: Reflections on the 150th Anniversary of Section 1983

Section 1983 is a landmark statute that provides the foundation for holding state and local governments and their agents accountable when they violate constitutional rights. Unfortunately, rather than enforce the statute’s text and ensure the accountability that its drafters passed it to achieve, the Supreme Court has created four interlocking doctrines that squelch its promise of accountability: qualified immunity, absolute immunity, strict limits on local governmental liability, and the exclusion of states from Section 1983. This Article, written to mark the 150th anniversary of Section 1983, does a deep dive into the text and history of Section 1983 and recovers a critical part of the story of its enactment that is all too often ignored: Congress made a conscious choice not to provide any official immunities because it did not want to place state officials above the law. Indeed, Congress passed Section 1983 to ensure that governments and their agents could be held accountable in a court of law. By gutting Section 1983 through rank judicial legislation, the Supreme Court has let states and local governments and their agents violate our most cherished constitutional rights with impunity, and left those victimized by abuse of power without any remedy.

Something for Nothing: Untangling a Knot of Section 230 Solutions

Social media platforms have become the dominant public forum of the modern age but there is a big problem: they are privately owned and can moderate content however they like. This right is protected both by the First Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the latter of which creates immunity from suit for platforms that exercise their right to moderate content by removing—or not removing—objectionable content. Politicians on both sides of the aisle have complained that platforms are abusing this immunity and, while they have put forward a wide variety of legislative solutions, none of them have come close to being passed. In response, this Note examines the pros and cons of these solutions and relies on First Amendment limits to put forward a legislative solution of its own.

Textualism, Dynamism, and the Meaning of "Sex"

A recent Article by Professors William N. Eskridge, Brian G. Slocum, and Stefan Th. Gries critically examines textualism, both in general and as applied in Bostock v. Clayton County. This Essay makes three points in reply. First, the authors criticize strawman versions of textualism that no mainstream legal interpreter claims to hold. Second, the authors’ examples of “societal dynamism” do not put any pressure on textualism properly understood. And third, the authors’ corpus-linguistics analysis of the word “sex” is, from a textualist perspective, irrelevant to the issue in Bostock.

Standardizing State Vote-by-Mail Deadlines in Federal Elections

The litigation over the vote-by-mail process during the 2020 general election revealed that absentee ballot voting disputes should not be left entirely to the courts. Rather, this Note argues that Congress should utilize its constitutional Elections Clause power to standardize federal vote-by-mail processes, and proposes specific elements that Congress should include in such legislation.

A Tale of Two Interoperabilities; Or, How Google v. Oracle Could Become Social Media Legislation

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Google v. Oracle shares a perhaps unexpected connection with recent legislative proposals to enhance social media competition. At first glance they are seemingly unrelated: the former deals with copyright protection in certain portions of software code, while the latter relates to interconnection between dominant online platforms and their competitors. Yet they are closely intertwined, such that a competitive platform environment cannot be fully achieved without addressing lingering questions in Google. As a result, lawmakers ought to be motivated to address software copyrights and related matters as part of their efforts to improve competition among social media and other online platforms.

The Unconstitutionality of State Bans on Marriage Between First Cousins

A majority of jurisdictions in the United States severely limit or prohibit the right of first cousins to marry, cohabit, or have intercourse. Yet, unlike regulation of other relationships within close degrees of consanguinity, for instance between parents and children or siblings, these statutes are relatively recent additions to the marriage regulation landscape. These bans are unsupported by the commonly-cited concerns of harmful genetic or societal consequences. First cousin-marriages are, instead, popular and permitted in much of the world—as they once were in the United States. This Article demonstrates that the prohibitions against first-cousin marriages directly contravene right-to-marry jurisprudence and are unjustified state interferences born of discriminatory bias.

Congress and Universal Injunctions

As the judicial and scholarly debate rages over the power of federal courts to issue universal or non-particularized injunctions, this paper explores the role of Congress in ending this controversy. It considers the details, wisdom, and efficacy of five legislative proposals to eliminate or limit universal/non-particularized injunctions; it concludes that one approach resolves the problem—a flat and unequivocal prohibition on injunctions that protect anyone other than the plaintiffs.

W(h)ither Judgment

Textualists complain that loose rules of statutory interpretation inject uncertainty and inconsistency into judicial resolutions of statutory ambiguity. But by employing an incomplete theory of meaning, pure textualists fail to shore up their decisions. And by disparaging the judgement necessary to navigate complex questions of meaning, they erode trust in the judicial process—the very foundation of the rule of law.