Introduction
Kesha Williams is a transgender woman with gender dysphoria who spent six months incarcerated in the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center in Virginia. When Williams first entered the facility, she was assigned to women’s housing and given the uniforms typically provided to female inmates. However, upon learning that Williams had not undergone transfeminine bottom surgery, prison deputies stripped Williams of her female undergarments and transferred her to the men’s side of the facility. There, Williams was harassed by other inmates, misgendered by prison deputies, and delayed in receiving medical treatment for her gender dysphoria. Following her release, Williams asserted several claims, among them a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Although the ADA has been recognized as one of the most pivotal pieces of civil rights legislation in this country, it has been largely unsuccessful in protecting against discrimination towards transgender people. While the ADA purports to guarantee protection for those with disabilities, § 12211 of the Act contains an exclusionary clause commonly referred to as the gender identity disorder (GID) exclusion. This section prevents “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments” from being recognized as a protected “disability” under the Act. Thus, until recently, many transgender litigants have left the GID exclusion virtually unchallenged.
However, in Williams v. Kincaid, the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court to rule that gender dysphoria was not within the GID exclusion, such that gender dysphoria constitutes a disability warranting protection under the ADA. Critically, the Williams majority recognized that there has been a shift in medical understanding as psychiatric authorities have replaced the term “gender identity disorder” with “gender dysphoria,” which suggests that the courts should pay deference to such distinction when interpreting technical words in a statute.
This Note discusses the groundbreaking ruling of Williams v. Kincaid and its important impact on transgender civil rights. Part I provides context by defining gender-related terms, detailing a brief history of the ADA, and explaining how courts interpret the ADA. Part I also examines the GID exclusion in the face of medical advances and ends by detailing the current legal landscape for gender dysphoria claims brought under the ADA. Part II outlines the facts and procedural history of Williams, and Part III describes its holding, reasoning, and dissent. Part IV offers support for the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and argues that the Williams majority was correct in taking an approach to statutory interpretation that goes slightly beyond traditional textualism in resolving this matter. Part IV further suggests that moving forward, trans litigants bringing claims under the ADA should follow Williams’ lead in presenting a three-pronged approach grounded, in part, in textualism. This Note concludes by highlighting Williams’ potential implications and the questions that it leaves unanswered, while also recognizing Williams as a victory for transgender advocates.