Earlier this year, Jennifer and James Crumbley were convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 10-15 years for not stopping their teenage son, Ethan, from killing four students at his high school. This is the first known occurrence of an American prosecutor obtaining a homicide conviction relying on a parental omission—or failure to act—where the victim was not the parent’s own child. Parental omissions historically have only triggered homicide charges if the parent fails to protect their child, not others, from harm. Unlike the general population, parents owe a special duty to their child because they are the ones tasked to oversee the child’s care. The Crumbley verdict has dislodged this longstanding criminal precedent. It has expanded a parent’s common law duty to include protection of the would-be victims of their child’s criminal acts. Recently, Georgia has brought manslaughter charges against the parent of a school shooter under similar circumstances. This Essay provides the first legal assessment of this prosecutorial theory and analyzes the various doctrinal, constitutional, and policy considerations surrounding its use.

This Essay contends that the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Harness v. Watson stands as a testament to its hypocrisy. The day after the Court professed an allegiance to promoting racial equality in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, it refused to even consider invalidating a clear barrier to racial equality. The day after the Court struck down a remedy designed to address a long, sad, and painful history of racism, the Court left undisturbed an obvious symbol of this long, sad, and painful history of racism. When juxtaposed against both the denial of certiorari in Harness and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s searing dissent for denial of certiorari, the Students for Fair Admissions majority’s lofty pronouncements about opposing racism amount to pure smoke and mirrors. The consistent through line that connects Students for Fair Admissions and Harness is the Roberts Court’s commitment to preserving anti-Black racism.

The ethical goals of the legal doctrine of informed consent are lofty. The law requires that clinicians explain the risks, benefits, and alternatives of proposed treatments to patients, and to respect patient autonomy through voluntary, informed medical decisions aligned with individual values and preferences. Yet in practice, patients often struggle to comprehend the risks and alternatives of a proposed medical intervention. Since investigators began analyzing the sufficiency of informed consent, it has been recognized that the current rules, which focus solely on clinical disclosures, are inadequate in addressing disparities associated with education, race/ethnicity, and age. Despite technically “adequate” disclosures under the legal doctrine of informed consent, patients may consent to major procedures with little substantive grasp of the risks. Shifting the law’s emphasis from disclosures alone to disclosure and comprehension will better align the ethical goals of informed consent with the legal rules that govern it.

Legal scholars delight in gap-filling. They frequently claim that their works have identified a gap in the literature and to have filled (or begun filling) that gap. However, all too often, these same papers fail to explain why the gap needed to be filled at all. Indeed, despite a robust tradition of meta-scholarship, the legal literature is largely devoid of a theory of academic gap-filling. This essay fills that gap, arguing that gap-filling for the sake of gap-filling is an error for three interconnected reasons. First, gaps might exist for a good reason. Second, concern with gap-filling is often a misguided attempt to address other issues that are tangential to legal scholarship. Finally, focusing on gaps is incredibly limiting. Instead, this essay suggests that legal scholars should focus on exploring questions that interest them, regardless of whether that exploration leads them to a “gap.”